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 1 
The Politics of Other Citizens 
White, Jonathan (2010), ‘The politics of other citizens’, Citizenship Studies, 14 (4). 411-
427. ISSN 1362-1025 
 
In all kinds of political action, citizens are confronted with the performances of other citizens.  An 
important guide to political behaviour is therefore likely to be the assumptions people make concerning 
how others can be expected to behave.  This paper explores common-sense ideas about other citizens as 
potential political participants, drawing on a series of group interviews conducted with taxi-drivers in 
Britain, Germany and the Czech Republic.  I argue the expectations voiced of other citizens tend to be 
pessimistic in nature, casting them as ignorant, apathetic, passive and/or selfish, notwithstanding the 
appearance of a more optimistic view which holds they can be expected to follow the lead of those who 
‘take a stand’.  These empirical observations lead to a discussion of the theoretical issues they raise, 
notably where to locate the origins of such views, and how to appraise their implications for democracy. 
 
All forms of political participation depend ultimately for their outcome on the actions of other 
members of the political community.
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  From the formation of social movements to the 
organisation of boycotts, collective action is rewarding to the extent that other citizens can be 
encouraged to participate.  Likewise voting choices vary in their impact according to the choices 
of others or their decisions to abstain.  Citizenship, one may say, is marked by the fact of 
interdependence.  More importantly, this is anything but a revelatory insight.  It is something that 
most citizens themselves are likely to acknowledge, following even the most basic form of 
political socialisation.  The implication is that there are therefore good reasons to explore the 
assumptions commonly made of other citizens, since what these ‘others’ can be expected to do is 
likely to be an influence both on individual acts of engagement and the health of democratic 
politics more generally.   
The potential significance of such views has been noted by a number of scholars.  In 
political psychology and communications, W. Phillips Davison developed the notion of the 
‘third-person effect’ to describe common expectations regarding the susceptibility of others to 
the negative influence of the mass media (Davison 1983).  His suggestion was that people 
generally overestimate the susceptibility of others to media persuasion while underestimating 
their own, a phenomenon liable to boost the popularity of censorship and other encroachments 
on free speech.  In the eyes of each, ‘I’ am immune to such influence, ‘you’ need to be careful, 
and ‘they’ need to be protected from exposure.  Popular expectations of others have also been 
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central to the literature on trust, where the problem tends to be formulated in rationalist terms as 
one of resource allocation: individuals face the challenge of determining how much trust to place 
in strangers under conditions where knowledge of their likely behaviour is limited and where 
excessive or insufficient trust can prove costly (Gambetta 1988) (Stolle and Hooghe 2004) 
(Hardin 2006) (Offe 1999).  Political capital, understood as the conditions necessary to a 
functioning democracy, is seen as dependent on underlying forms of social capital to do with the 
incentives and opportunities to trust, interact and display community feeling (Putnam 2000). 
This article’s focus is slightly different.  It casts the net more widely than questions of 
perceived media influence and their implications for free speech, and in this sense departs from 
the communications literature.  While undeniably of special importance, such concerns reflect 
the priorities of one political tradition in particular, namely liberal individualism, and a more 
complete treatment requires one to keep in mind the concerns of other traditions such as 
deliberative or adversarial republicanism.  Then, in contrast to much of the trust literature, the 
emphasis here is not so much on general dispositions towards others in society but specifically 
on expectations of others as political participants, who do or do not seek to take action on 
substantive matters of common concern.  The focus is directly on the health of citizenship and 
political community, in other words, not society, community or social integration in a general 
sense.
2
  
Perhaps the most similar approach is found in the work of John Hibbing and Elizabeth 
Theiss-Morse, who as part of their elaboration of the concept of stealth democracy explore 
American public perceptions about the political capabilities and inclinations of US citizens 
(Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, pp.112ff.).  They find high levels of scepticism regarding the 
political engagement of others, and the empirical observations we shall trace below indicate 
many of their findings for the US population can plausibly be extended to populations in Europe.  
That fellow citizens can be presumed to be politically unaware, apathetic, passive and unduly 
self-interested are views that arise in a series of group interviews conducted by the author with 
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taxi-drivers in Britain, Germany and the Czech Republic, explored in some depth in what 
follows. 
Yet in addition to drawing attention to a distinctive aspect of our empirical material, in 
which the possibility of galvanising other citizens is raised, we shall explore ways to think 
differently about the theoretical implications of the findings.  Hibbing and Theiss-Morse use 
their results to support the wider claim that political theorists need to respect the public’s desire 
to remain largely aloof from daily politics.  In contrast, here it will be noted not only that 
participants to the research themselves tend to express a certain dissatisfaction with the negative 
qualities they identify in others, but that there are good reasons why contemporary observers of 
democracy should be concerned about the kinds of assumption expressed.  The second part of the 
paper is therefore devoted to thinking theoretically about the nature and significance of the 
patterns detected, notably their origins and their likely political consequences. 
 
 
Studying Discursive Practices 
 
To explore expectations of ‘the politics of other citizens’ requires one first to delimit the research 
field.  In particular, how should one understand the notion of ‘other citizens’?  There is a sense, 
after all, in which any social category and its related associations can be seen as evoking ideas 
about other citizens insofar as the category includes as its intended referents other members of 
the political community.  So, for example, social categories such as ‘businessmen’, ‘Muslims’, 
‘Christians’, ‘police-officers’, ‘single mothers’, ‘the unemployed’, and ‘philanthropists’ might all 
be treated as particular kinds in the generic category of fellow citizen, and thus examined for 
their accompanying patterns of usage or category knowledge.   
It may be possible however to mark out for investigation a smaller, distinctive set of 
expectations linked more closely to the idea of citizenship.  These are those expectations 
associated with the word ‘citizen’ itself, and with related words such as ‘voters’, ‘followers’, 
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‘others’, ‘people’, ‘people in this country / of our nationality’, ‘the general public’, ‘society’, 
‘everyone’, and others of the kind we shall encounter below as they are invoked by speakers 
when discussing the political inclinations of others.  In one sense these are social categories like 
any other, and it would be mistaken to treat them as overarching ones that incorporate the 
multitude of social roles according to some principle of generality.  To express views about 
‘everyone’ is not the same as to express views about people of all social descriptions.  Yet from 
the perspective of the politically interested observer these categories do have a special 
significance, in that they are amongst those likely to be most salient for many forms of political 
participation.  If practices and concepts tend to cluster with one another (Swidler 2001), one can 
assume these are amongst the categories likely to cluster around practices such as the electoral 
process and various types of collective action.  During election campaigns and on election day, 
‘the voter’ is likely to be a prominent idea, while in the preparation and enactment of a strike, 
boycott, or act of civil disobedience, ‘the general public’ will probably be a relevant 
consideration.  These are categories of special significance in the practices and discourse of 
citizenship, and the expectations which attach to them are likely to be significant both for 
concrete political actions and for the more general self-understanding of the political community. 
Expectations and assumptions can be treated as routinised discursive practices – the 
patterned ways of speaking recurrent in everyday talk.  While sometimes they may express 
consciously formed views, perhaps more often they express the taken-for-granted ideas that 
precede deliberation and reflection (Schatzki et al. 2001).  As such, they are best studied not by 
questionnaires aiming to elicit fully-formed ‘beliefs’, but through the close analysis of naturally-
occurring or loosely structured texts.  Lightly moderated group interviews provide a useful 
means to study everyday discursive practices of this kind.  They allow considerable scope for 
participants to set the terms of discussion, and involve participants interacting with each other as 
well as the researcher (Morgan 1997).  The audience for each intervention is not just a scholarly 
one but a peer-group one, implying that speakers cannot afford to attune themselves only to the 
expected reactions of the former.   
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What follows draws on material generated in ten group interviews with taxi-drivers 
conducted in Britain, Germany and the Czech Republic between October 2004 and August 2005.  
The study was designed to explore various aspects of common-sense understandings of politics 
and political problems, with participants invited to speak freely about the topics of importance to 
them with limited interference from the researcher (Author 2009a) (Author 2009b).
3
  
Consequently, the kinds of discursive practice that will be highlighted, to do with other citizens 
as potential political actors, were made spontaneously rather than in response to a concerted 
effort to draw discussion towards them.  This element of spontaneity can be seen as one of the 
approach’s virtues, though admittedly it involves a trade-off: the data are therefore 
unstandardised and unevenly dispersed through the material, making formal cross-national 
comparisons difficult.  The logic of analysis is thus an exploratory one: to probe a number of 
settings for patterns of theoretical relevance, as a prelude to thinking about their implications, 
rather than to isolate particular discursive features as distinctive of a certain national or social 
position. 
This logic informed the selection of taxi-drivers as subjects for interview, the 
supposition being that their conversation forms a particularly fertile site for studying forms of 
discursive practice likely to extend more widely in society.  Taxi-drivers are exposed to a wide 
range of social stimuli – newspapers, the radio, and the experiences of others as narrated to them 
on the job – placing them at the intersection of a large number of discursive formations.  The 
cities for interview were chosen on grounds of geographical spread and diversity in the 
consolidation of democratic structures: three in Britain (Reading, Swansea and Norwich); three 
in the Czech Republic (Plzeň, Liberec and Ostrava), and four in Germany, including one from 
the former East (Erfurt) and three from the former West (Lübeck, Kassel and Würzburg).  
Groups of three to four drivers (thirty-seven participants in total) were recruited using financial 
incentives and assembled in cafés and pubs for discussions of up to two hours.
4
  An effort was 
made to recruit those already in conversation, facilitating richness and depth of discussion.   
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As indicated, the study does not seek to examine hypotheses concerning the relationship between 
discursive practice and exogenous identities to do with class, sex, or ethnic background.  
Consistent with this is the simplicity of the sampling criteria used: a diversity of ages was sought 
for each group, with the youngest driver in his 20s or 30s and the oldest in his 50s or 60s, and 
where ethnic minorities were evident on the taxi-rank (as at Reading), it was made certain that 
the sample reflected this diversity.  Female drivers were rare in the ten cities studied, and did not 
feature in the sample.  Their absence clearly reduces the extent to which the sample is 
representative of ‘society’ as defined by socio-demographic make-up, but less so the extent to 
which it can be used to uncover discursive patterns of theoretical interest. 
 
 
Some Observations from Discussions with Taxi-Drivers 
 
Of the ten interviews conducted, not all featured the expression of views towards others qua 
citizens.  In many cases discussion focused mainly on ‘us’, as victims of problems such as bad 
working conditions, low income, or inadequate provision of law and order, accompanied by the 
evocation of specific others using categories such as ‘the rich’, ‘criminals’, ‘the unemployed’, or 
particular ethnic groups (Author 2009a).  The evocation of other citizens in the guise of potential 
political actors was rarer – in the Swansea and Plzeň groups, there was little material one could 
read in this way.  It may be that non-reference itself should be seen as a kind of routinised 
practice, albeit one of omission, expressing scepticism towards other citizens by treating them as 
unworthy of mention.  To evoke the political potential of others, or to criticise them for failing to 
realise that potential, already requires the assumption of their relevance.  It is likely that a basic 
discursive repertoire of citizenship, affirmative of the political importance of other citizens, 
needs to be available to participants before conversation can take this turn, and that this 
repertoire is unevenly spread.  Nonetheless, references across the groups as a whole were 
sufficiently numerous as to allow a series of key points to be made. 
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The ignorance of other citizens 
As the first of a series of pessimistic assumptions regarding what can be expected from others, a 
prominent idea is that other citizens are ignorant or naïve in political matters, with opinions ill-
considered or lightly held, and are therefore easily misled.  In the Liberec discussion, Tomáš and 
Zdeněk agree that ‘people’ in the Czech Republic tend to vote without thinking: ‘Maybe the 
ODS [centre-right party] is doing well in the polls,’ says Tomáš, ‘but that’s not because people 
believe it’ll be better under them [Z: it’s not true ...]  It’s not true, they just don’t think about it at 
all.  [Z:  They just refuse to give their vote to the government … they vote for the stronger 
party.]’  The participants themselves invoke the Left-Right spectrum with considerable 
confidence when talking about parties, but express doubt concerning the capacity of others to 
think likewise: ‘here in the Czech Republic,’ says Tomáš, ‘the left-wing perspective still 
prevails, people would rather have security than say “I’ll do everything for myself ... don’t look 
after me.”’  But when the right-of-centre ODS party does well, it reflects not a considered shift in 
political views but the mindlessness with which people vote.  ‘People go and vote for the Right 
without knowing what the Right intends to do, simply because they think that those in 
government are doing badly.  And then they discover that the new ones do badly and after four 
years they jump back to the first ones.  It’s ignorance.  [Z: yeah]  In schools they don’t teach a 
single word about politics.  Children don’t know what a political party is or where they stand.’   
 
The apathy of other citizens 
The lack of political engagement ‘most people’ display is a theme in the discussion at Erfurt.  
When Matthias suggests there should have been a referendum on the introduction of the euro 
because ‘then it definitely would not have been brought in,’ the other participants are dubious.  
‘Probably only 20% would have gone along to the referendum,’ says Axel.  Harald suggests the 
problem is that ‘there’s simply no understanding of democracy there …  Most people have 
always been led and most people want to be led in some direction.  They let themselves be led.  
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That’s the point, Man is a herd animal.  Put the right one in front of them and they’ll traipse 
along behind.  Whether it’s to an election or to a demonstration or to a referendum.  A few go 
along and the others just sit there, for whatever reason.’  Matthias maintains the prospect of the 
euro was sufficiently disliked to cause a large turnout, but his voice is in the minority; Axel 
reminds that ‘at the last election it was also assumed that lots of people would turn out to vote 
because everyone was saying that it can’t be right that the SPD stays in power.  And even so one 
ended up with a participation rate of a small percentage.’  ‘People are simply cynical,’ adds 
Harald.  ‘They have too many problems …  They haven’t got eyes and ears for anything else.  
And that’s why they can be pushed around this way and that.’   
A similar set of assumptions is expressed elsewhere in the same discussion: 
 
Harald:  You know, [democracy] it’s a pseudo-issue.  For a certain period of time the people are 
shepherded along with a stick, they’re led along with promises, and unfortunately they’re taken in by it 
because they don’t have their own opinion. 
 
Uli:  And 40% of them don’t realise it.  The only resource in a democracy is to go and vote. 
 
Harald:  And they don’t do that.  In Germany democracy is just a pseudo-democracy, because you’ve got no 
chance of affecting things afterwards.  [Axel:  Wait, you do have the chance …]  But it’s not given to you 
… 
 
Axel:  It is given to you.  It’s given to you.  But you have to start at the bottom.  I can’t simply go to the top 
and yank Schröder out and say ‘Oi, Gerhard, listen up.’  It doesn’t work like that.  No, but I can start 
with the municipality.  I vote in the municipal elections … [Uli: yeah] and at the municipal level 
you’ve got the opportunity, you can go there and you can raise a complaint with the administrative 
office [Verwaltungsamt] or whatever.  It’s just people aren’t aware.  And that’s why no-one bothers 
about it now. 
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Notable here again is the contrast between the engagement and awareness participants claim for 
themselves and that which they ascribe to others.  Both Uli and Axel underline the possibilities 
which voting holds, and generally avoid a tone of cynicism about democracy as an ideal.  Yet 
there is scepticism about the willingness of other citizens to fulfil their role, and an emphasis on 
the ignorance of democracy which ‘people’ generally display.   
It seems natural then that they should emphasise the need to educate people so that they 
become more aware and more sophisticated in their opinions.  ‘Everyone has the chance – in 
simple human terms – everyone can develop for themselves their own opinion,’ says Axel.  ‘And 
they should do it, and it should be promoted in school.’  Uli laments that ‘at the mass level it’s 
not being done.’  Axel reiterates the point elsewhere, and refers to the influence of the media in a 
way redolent of Davison’s ideas on the third-person effect:  ‘this “great” [ironic] newspaper we 
have here in Germany, the Bild Zeitung, that gathers up the opinion of the mob [Pöbel].  And the 
mob, I must quite honestly say, as soon as they read the newspaper they don’t form any further 
opinion for themselves.  Even if the name of the newspaper is “Bild” – “Bild Dir Deine Menung” 
[“Form your own opinion”]5.  They don’t form themselves an opinion.’  Harald, in a separate 
deployment of the herd motif, worries about the danger of people becoming convinced of the 
wrong ideas: ‘the danger, whether back then with Adolf [Hitler] when there were ten million 
unemployed, or today when there are five million unemployed, Man is a herd-animal.  If you put 
the right one in front of them they’ll trot along behind.’  For Axel, a suitable goal then is to 
‘strive to educate children to some degree so that they can form their own opinion – not a Bild 
opinion, but their own opinion.  And I don’t mean necessarily the opinion that I have – it doesn’t 
always have to be the right opinion!  But to have one’s own opinion …’  Note how this emphasis 
on education implies both a dissatisfaction with the way things stand, and the sense that they 
could feasibly be improved. 
 
The passivity and pessimism of other citizens 
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Alongside the assumption of other people’s political unawareness or superficiality, one finds the 
expectation they may be too cautious or inert when it comes to taking action in response to 
common problems, and too pessimistic about the likelihood of success.  At Reading, for 
example, there is some discussion of people’s passivity before rising petrol prices, with a 
comparison with France used to underline the point.  ‘We’ are concluded in the criticism: ‘it’s 
weird,’ says Malik, ‘how most things, we just take it lying down over here.  [Derek:  Every time, 
yeah…]  Like, the French, they won’t.  They’ll have a revolution, get the guillotines out … [D:  
Stop the boats, stop everything, yeah …]  But no matter what happens over here, you know, goes 
up another 5p, 10p, pound, ‘oh yeah, ok …’  Bit like sheep here in that sense aren’t we, plod 
along …  [D:  Yeah, you moan, but you don’t do anything about it …]’  In a similar vein, Ulrich 
in Würzburg suggests that ‘people here in Germany, they have the wrong way of looking at 
things. ...  They always see things immediately as “Oh God, nothing will come of it.”  ... [Ralf: 
yeah]  Here the glass is always half empty.  With Americans for example it’s half full.  Not that I 
find America great or anything, but we drive around enough Americans here and they just have a 
bit of a different feel for life ... [Oskar: ... the mentality ...].’  At Norwich, there is talk of the 
harmful effects of supermarkets on consumers and small shops, with Malcolm noting: ‘And we 
are the mugs who take it.  We should go in there, we should go into Asda or Morrisons or 
whatever and we should turn round and say “Get that foreign crap out of our house.”’  Les, 
however, expresses doubts: not everyone can be relied upon to take action, and ‘until everybody 
decides to do it, it’ll never happen.  They [the supermarkets] have got the upper hand all the time 
and they’ll do what they want to do.’ 
 
The selfishness of other citizens 
A related assumption holds that other citizens lack public-spiritedness.  They are taken to be 
motivated mainly by immediate self-interest, with little willingness to ‘get involved’ or 
contribute to the collective good.  Such a perspective takes a number of forms, from the 
assumption that other citizens vote according to narrow self-interest rather than wider 
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considerations, to the assumption they prevent the successful implementation of government 
policies (taxation regimes, recycling programmes, etc.).  In the discussion at Kassel, the 
willingness of fellow citizens to litter the local environment is treated as emblematic: Dieter 
complains: ‘when you confront people [for social misdemeanours] they don’t want to talk about 
it.  Like I said, colleagues in the taxi trade, if you go up to them because they’ve thrown their 
cigarette butt on the pavement they curse you!’  ‘They push the matter away,’ agrees Peter, ‘and 
they say “that doesn’t affect me!” [D: yeah].’  There is a need, suggests Hans, ‘to make people 
aware that it does affect them.’  Elsewhere in the same discussion, Sebastian suggests today the 
focus is always on ‘me’.  ‘Forty, fifty years ago, after the war, you always said ‘we’ and you 
helped each other.  Now it’s “I”.’  At Norwich, as elsewhere, there is considerable discussion of 
people’s unwillingness to put pressure on their fellow citizens to follow ‘the rules’, whether 
these be the rules of good social behaviour or those established in law.  Les recalls how he once 
intervened when seeing ‘two lads with their eyes on a young lady there, and if I hadn’t said 
something to one of the lads I don’t know where she would have been,’ but he is sceptical about 
the willingness of others to display similar public-spiritedness: ‘Trouble is that there’s so many 
people now that go around with their heads in the bloody clouds and they don’t look really 
around them.  …  They don’t look.  …  They’re more happy to go along with what’s happening 
rather than put themselves out to change it.’ 
 
The possibility of galvanising other citizens? 
The patterns noted so far largely echo those recorded by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse for the 
contemporary US population.  In their focus-group research, the presumption of apathy and 
selfishness is widespread, as is the presumption that other citizens do not hold real views.  As 
one of their participants says, ‘you’ve got so many people that are just blind sheep that follow 
everything that the media throws at them,’ (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, p.116).  Perhaps 
there is a difference in tone though: amongst the groups studied for this article, there tends to be 
a sense of dissatisfaction expressed in accompaniment to these observations, as one sees in the 
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calls for education.  The characteristics ascribed to other citizens are regarded critically, as a 
departure from the standards which democracy requires.  In the passages analysed by Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morse, this critical tone is less prominent, whether this be due to an empirical 
difference or to the authors’ criteria of selection and evaluation. 
Furthermore, analysis of these European interviews would be incomplete if one omitted 
reference to the appearance of a more positive perspective unmentioned in the US study.  To his 
previous comment about people with their heads in the clouds, Les in Norwich adds that if 
someone were to start a neighbourhood-watch scheme, ‘to build on this issue, you’d probably 
find they would follow.’  This marks a potentially important counter-theme: while other citizens 
may be deficient in levels of political awareness, easily misled, too passive, and unwilling to act 
for the common interest, if someone were to take the initiative, whether it be ‘people like us’ or 
an individual of unusual insight, then others might be willing to follow.  Next to the pessimistic 
assumptions noted, this stands out as more optimistic, though its implications are potentially 
problematic.  An indication is provided in an extended passage from the Norwich discussion: 
 
Les:  I tell you what would be nice: if the working-class stood up, everybody, and said ‘look, enough is 
enough …’  [Author:  How would you go about doing that?]  All you’d need is somebody who’s a real 
leader.  To spell it out.  Like you’ve now done with us four.  If you could do that with four million … 
 
Bill:  Proper working-class, good public speaker, someone probably … example would probably be Sir Bob 
Geldof.  I mean, he’s a nob, a Sir, but he is a working-class lad, and he’d probably believe in the same 
values.  [Malcolm:  If you ever called him Sir Bob he’d knock your teeth out …]  You need someone to 
stand up for us.  Somebody we could actually all vote for, instead of saying ‘he’s the best of a bad 
bunch.’  […]  The trouble you’ve got at the moment, the working class, that is a big vote but you’ve got a 
lot now who feel they’ve got no choice, they’re moving towards the BNP [British National Party].  
You’ve got the ones, the more left-wing, voting for the Socialist Workers’ Party.  And they’re a waste of 
votes, moves neither way.  You’ve got to get them back in the mainstream, but if they don’t like what 
they’re voting for, you know … 
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Les:  What’s that coloured bloke’s name, he who stood up for all the black people who lived in America … 
[Bill:  Martin Luther King?]  Martin Luther King.  If you had somebody like him, talking sense, you 
could probably bring …  I mean, it wouldn’t take a lot for the working … cos I think working people 
have had enough, to be honest, really.  Why should we … [Bill:  Yeah.]  Because all our money goes in 
the pot, and it’s all shared out with people that are taking it.   
 
Malcolm:  […]  Too many leaders with not enough bottle, too many leaders with not enough charisma, not 
enough belief, because belief breeds belief.  If we voted at this table today and said ‘right, that’s it, the 
Council don’t take the piss out of us anymore, the police don’t take the piss out of us anymore, the 
punters [customers] don’t take the piss out of us anymore,’ and we really believed it and we went back 
and said to Joe Bloggs on the rank ‘this is how it’s going to be from now on,’ what do you think?  
Eventually it would spread.  It’s the same with our country.  This is a great country, I love my country, 
my heart bleeds red, white and blue, and that’s as simple as that.  And if everybody stood up and said 
‘right’ ...  But it’s only the working-class people.  The rich people, the financial institutions, they turn 
round and say ‘how much money can I make from these poor people?’   
 
Les:  That’s what I’m saying.  The rich can’t be arsed with it, the middle lot - which is ourselves – have got 
no chance, and you’ve got the people down the bottom who are taking all the money anyway, like his 
next-door neighbour, them people are taking it all.  And you’re left with nothing.  We’re left bloody 
bleeding in the gutter.  That’s basically what it is.  It’s terrible really, but where do you go?   
 
Malcolm:  You have to have enough people with enough belief in what they believe in to be able to spread 
that word with enough conviction.  Like …  Now he [points to Bill] would make a good leader.  I would 
follow him, cos I know he would follow it through.  If he said to me ‘do you want to get your own back 
on the police for not clearing out taxi-ranks on a Saturday night?  We’re going to drive around and 
around and around the city, really slowly … Nobody can get to the cinemas, they’re going to complain 
because they’re not getting the revenue, well fuck ’em.  Fuck the lot of them.  We deserve to have what 
we’ve paid for.  Not because they can’t be bothered to give what we’ve paid for.’  If he said he would do 
that, I’d follow him.  And I’d risk getting arrested for it. 
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Gary:  You’d only get half … you’d only get half the drivers wanting to do it.  The rest of them … one of 
the people would probably get nicked [arrested] and the rest would carry on working, you’ve got to get 
everyone … 
 
Bill:  That is the trouble.  That is basically … same as the country – unity.  You’ve always got someone 
who’ll profit.  Like you said, they’ll always be someone looking ‘ah, I can make a profit …’ 
 
This is a very rich passage, particularly in its evocation of class-based forms of subjecthood, and 
not all such elements will be examined here.  Notable for our purposes are the kinds of 
assumption expressed about other citizens.  It will have been noted that many of the sceptical 
motifs traced above are to be found here too: an attempt at ‘direct action’, for example, would be 
compromised by the unwillingness of others to take risks for a collective cause, indeed their 
desire to take advantage of the situation.  At the same time, however, one sees the idea that if a 
‘real leader’ with sufficient charisma (perhaps one of ‘us’) were to take the initiative then others 
would probably follow, as they have on historical occasions.  Luther King and the pop-singer 
turned activist Bob Geldof are mentioned favourably, and a few sentences before this extract Bill 
highlights Lech Wałęsa as a ‘brilliant man’ for leading the ship-builders of Poland against the 
Communist regime.  If the leader is a ‘good’ one, both in terms of personal effectiveness and the 
cause represented, one can expect others to get behind him.  It is an affirmation of the possibility 
of galvanising people for the pursuit of shared ends.   
 Notice though the emphasis which is placed on key individuals.  Perhaps the danger 
implicit is that the call for a strong and effective leader is driven at least in part exactly by the 
scepticism concerning the inclinations of other citizens.  Their political failings or hesitations 
need to be overcome by the force of a charismatic individual, someone who can ‘spell it out’.  
Such a perspective may be seen to carry an authoritarian tendency.  It also seems conducive to 
what one might call a ‘populism against “the people”’ – an act of positioning not just against 
those opponents deemed generative of hardship, but in the name of ‘people with belief’ against 
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those peers considered to be undermining the collective effort.  We shall return to some of the 
implications below. 
 
Contradiction? 
One sees elements of inconsistency in the passage above regarding what can be expected of 
others.  Within the interventions of Bill alone, other citizens are treated both as potential 
followers of a collective cause, and as self-interested individuals who resist organisation and who 
can be expected to break off from such a project so as to pursue their own profit.  The two 
positions are not incompatible – naturally ‘other citizens’ may be of both such types – but the 
emphasis is clearly different in the two cases.  Likewise there is a certain incongruence in the 
Erfurt discussion (though not quite a paradox) in the assumptions noted above whereby other 
citizens are considered essentially inert yet liable to gather like sheep behind a disreputable 
cause.  This suggests one should think not in terms of a settled body of beliefs about other 
citizens but a complex array of discursive patterns which do not necessarily amount to a coherent 
whole.
6
  Negative or sceptical assumptions outweigh the positive in these discussions, but there 
is more than one logic in play. 
Drawing on existing empirical research (Gamson 1992), it may be possible to propose 
an underlying pattern here – albeit not one which necessarily restores logical unity.  Variations in 
the kinds of assumption which prevail may depend on the degree of specificity with which the 
situation at hand is articulated.  Where the discussion is at a quite general level, without a clearly 
defined issue at stake and with other citizens appearing in the rather abstract and colourless guise 
of ‘people’ or ‘voters’, one might expect the scepticism to be stronger: there is no clear course of 
action to be taken, and the demands of engagement may appear higher.  Where there is a specific 
issue at stake (a new tax, for example), and where ‘we’ and ‘they’ are given sharper definition, 
one might expect the more positive assumptions to come through.  The goals may appear more 
modest and more achievable, and a stronger sense of an adversarial relationship may engender a 
greater sense of their being ‘people like us’ with whom solidarity is possible (Gamson 1992, 
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p.7).  In the extended passage above, it does seem possible to identify a stronger faith in other 
citizens insofar as they are cast as the ‘working class’, with clearly demarcated opponents, than 
where they are cast in vaguer terms as ‘someone’ or ‘the rest of them’. 
An interpretation of this kind locates the sources of ‘inconsistency’ not so much in the 
individual mind but in the contrasting associations of different discursive formations.  When 
speakers draw on the language of citizenship, they express a level of scepticism not necessarily 
replicated when drawing on alternative repertoires.  While individuals may have some freedom 
to select between these – the metaphor of a ‘toolkit’ is attractive (Swidler 2001b) – they are 
nevertheless limited by the conventional usages of those they choose, and those which other 
speakers press upon them. 
The locations for these interviews spanned three different countries, as well as Europe’s 
former political division between East and West.  Noticeable in the material collected is how 
rather similar discursive practices can be found dispersed across these various sites – across old 
democracies and new, and prosperous cities and poor.  At least on the evidence available, there 
are few grounds for localising the patterns.  That said, some of the particular associations these 
motifs carry must surely vary across these differing contexts.  The relative novelty of democratic 
structures in the post-communist cities (Erfurt and those in the Czech Republic) means that when 
speakers decry the political ignorance and apathy of other citizens they may be read as 
simultaneously suggesting those citizens have failed to adapt to changed circumstances, and 
perhaps are ‘not ready’ for democracy.  There may be the implication they retain Communist 
sympathies, or are in some way morally tarnished by the previous regime.  Criticisms may also 
carry the sense of recent disillusionment in the wake of higher expectations, in a manner one 
could less easily associate with participants in Britain and western Germany.  Likewise, in the 
German locations one must assume that references to people gathering behind a strong leader 
have distinctive connotations of the Third Reich experience (a point supported by certain 
references to Hitler).  Enthusiasm for leadership of the kind expressed in the Norwich discussion 
is surely less easily produced by German speakers without conjuring such echoes of the 
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country’s past.  These nuances and others caution against neglecting the variety of meanings that 
may accompany these motifs, notwithstanding the similarity of form. 
 
 
Interpreting Interpretations: a Discussion 
 
While these exploratory observations leave much scope for further study, when matched against 
the existing work in this area one has the basis for some discussion of implications.  In what 
follows, these are framed in terms of two questions: the social-science question, which asks how 
to explain the ostensible prevalence of negative assumptions about other citizens, and the 
political-theory question, which asks what the political significance may be. 
 
The social-science question: four candidate explanations 
In thinking about how to explain these discursive patterns, perhaps the default position would be 
to treat them as truth-claims and regard them as accounted for by empirical reality.  On this 
reading, the notion that other citizens are largely politically unaware, unengaged, and all too 
willing to focus on their narrow self-interests, is prevalent because ultimately it is broadly 
correct: this is how people generally are, and the interviewees are accurate in their assessments.  
Let us call this the realist interpretation.  Such a view may seem especially inviting given that 
arguably it accords with the common sense amongst political scientists.  Those who understand 
democracy following a Schumpeterian model are likely to be sceptical of the political 
competence of most citizens, echoing the assumptions traceable in the discourse of taxi-drivers.  
Even observers who accept the possibility that things could be different under different 
conditions may consider these assumptions appropriate to democracy as it currently exists.  
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse do not claim citizens lack fundamental ability, but do treat apathy 
regarding most policy-issues and a general distaste for politics as brute facts of the contemporary 
US population (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, pp.8-9). 
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The grounds for adopting this perspective are by no means clear though.  Even if one 
accepts the reality of a contemporary trend towards decreasing participation (Mair 2006), it is 
unclear whether it indicates widespread apathy amongst citizens: high levels of concern on 
substantive issues may be matched by fatalism regarding what can be achieved through 
participation.
7
  The very evidence of these interviews, in which taxi-drivers in multiple locations 
talk expansively on a range of political topics, suggests some level of basic engagement.  
Furthermore, the contradictory element noted above suggests one cannot simply account for 
these discursive practices by treating them as correct descriptions of reality: even if some had a 
basis in truth, they could not all.  There is a danger, in other words, that the scholar falls victim to 
something analogous to Davison’s third-person effect, positioning him/herself as ‘I’ the keen 
observer, speaking to ‘you’ the sensible reader, about the limitations of ‘they’ the other citizens, 
in a way the empirical evidence fails to justify. 
Needless to say, one need not conclude such assumptions are false.  A statement so 
definitive would also be problematic.  If one rejects the idea that negative assumptions appear 
simply because they are accurate descriptions of reality, there are various alternative perspectives 
one might adopt while remaining open on the question of truth status.  Three can be mentioned, 
in ascending order of appeal.  The first would be an a-historical one which locates their origins in 
human nature.  The denigration of the political competence of other citizens might be treated as a 
strategy for self-enhancement or group bonding, whereby individual speakers derive satisfaction 
and a basis for in-group identification by positioning themselves and those like them as more 
sophisticated and engaged than others.  ‘We’ are made to seem more public-spirited than the rest, 
and are positioned as realistic, since not too much is expected from others.  Insofar as ‘we’ are 
sometimes included within the scope of criticism, one might suspect a strategy of self-
justification: ‘our’ inaction is normalised by projecting passivity onto ‘them’, suggesting others 
are no better and that there is little ‘we’ could achieve alone.  Interpretations such as these can be 
called (social-) psychological.  They do not focus on whether everyday assumptions about other 
citizens are true or false, but do take them to have an underlying basis, namely in the speakers’ 
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psychological make-up.  While there may be an important insight here, the danger – as with all 
psychological approaches – is that one overlooks the significance of the social context in its 
historical specificity as an influence on individual behaviour.  One may give a universality to 
something grounded in a certain constellation of conditions. 
An alternative perspective would be to link these patterns of discourse to the life 
experiences of the speakers who articulate them, in this case taxi-drivers.  One might speculate 
that taxi-driving, which involves serving ‘other citizens’ in return for money, and which can 
place its proponents in a position of vulnerability, invites cynicism and scepticism towards 
others, and encourages in-group identification at the expense of strangers.  Such a reading is 
local in focus, in that it sees these discursive practices as specific to the kinds of people who 
articulate them, and as performing a certain function in the circumstances of their encounter.  
One might term it a situational interpretation.  Its appeal lies in the refusal to treat these 
discursive practices as objectively or psychologically pre-determined, and in its sensitivity to the 
experiences of the individual.  Perhaps the concern however will be that it results in putting too 
much emphasis on certain socio-demographic characteristics, and on the separation of those 
bearing them from the rest of society.  Moreover, such a move neglects the noted resonance with 
the findings of other studies which did not draw specifically on taxi-drivers or those of the same 
economic and national background.   
A final standpoint would regard the discursive practices traced as a contingent way of 
seeing the political world, dominant due to a particular set of wider features of contemporary 
life.  One might argue for example that media amplification of short-term trends in voting 
behaviour and social interaction leads to notions such as ‘citizen apathy’ or the ‘me-society’ 
gaining a footing in everyday discourse, whether or not those same trends continue over time.  
Media actors of a certain political persuasion might want to encourage such ideas and cement 
their commonsense plausibility insofar as they point to a political configuration they find 
favourable, while political parties in turn, convinced of the influence of the media and wishing to 
conform to the reality thereby produced, may start to peddle the same ideas (Meyer and 
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Hinchman 2002).  A historical interpretation along these lines would thus invite one to remain 
open not just on the question of whether such discursive practices have a basis in truth, but also 
on whether they are permanent or contingent features of mass politics.  Rather than objectively 
or psychologically determined, they may be seen as a field contested by the strategic actions of 
powerful agents (Rothstein 2005), and bearing the traces of political conflicts.  This historical 
view seems a reasonable one to adopt, since it avoids a determinist perspective and makes space 
for a critical stance.  If one rejects the idea that the prevalence of these practices is inevitable 
under current conditions, one can then ask critically what their implications may be, and whether 
there are reasons why one might want to see them challenged.   
 
The political-theory question: three evaluations of significance 
This second question then focuses not so much on how to explain these views, but how to 
evaluate the significance of their being voiced.  To a large extent, this is a question of how 
discursive practice relates to other forms of practice whose value one appraises against the 
backdrop of a preferred model of politics.  What, for example, may the willingness to express 
such assumptions imply for voting behaviour or the (non-)formation of collective movements?  
Will such forms of political participation be adversely affected?  While strong causal 
connections between talk and action are rarely possible, it seems plausible to suppose an 
enabling significance: that is, that routinised ways of making sense of the world make certain 
kinds of behaviour more likely than others.  Examining how various political-theoretical 
traditions might assess the empirical phenomena noted above, it should be possible to highlight 
these implications. 
One way to divide contemporary theories of democracy is into three broad families, 
aggregative, deliberative, and agonistic approaches, with their principal differences as follows 
(Mouffe 2000): 
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 Preference Aggregation Deliberative Dem. Agonism 
 
Interpretation of 
popular 
sovereignty / 
collective self-rule 
 
 
Ability to hold rulers 
accountable in periodic 
elections 
 
Achievement of a rational 
consensus on the common 
good 
 
Pursuit of collective ends 
in a process of agonistic 
struggle 
 
Key political 
activity of lay 
citizens 
 
 
Voting in competitive 
elections 
 
Contributing to the 
deliberative process, so as to 
reach decisions all can 
reasonably accept 
 
Movement formation and 
/ or participation  
 
What holds the 
political 
community 
together 
 
 
Interests, and maybe 
some form of 
overarching ‘identity’ 
 
Values (universal or 
particular), some form of 
‘love of justice’ 
 
Common action in 
pursuit of political goals 
 
These three perspectives imply somewhat different evaluations of the assumptions 
sketched above.  Perhaps the perspective likely to be least disturbed by them is the first, the 
preference-aggregative approach.  This perspective overlaps significantly with the realist one 
mentioned above, relegating the political role of the average citizen mainly to participation in 
elections.  So long as citizens have a basic degree of confidence in their representatives’ ability 
to promote their interests, and the willingness occasionally to cast judgement, their regard for 
other citizens is not greatly important.  Discursive practices of the kind noted are likely to be 
treated as further reminder of the implausibility of alternative models which envisage a greater 
degree of individual participation or forms of collective action.  A normative evaluation of this 
kind seems implicit in the way Hibbing and Theiss-Morse interpret their findings: while they see 
a need to foster the appreciation that citizens may reasonably disagree on matters of political 
relevance, they see little need to convince citizens of the engagement of others, nor raise overall 
levels of engagement and participation.  On the contrary, people’s aversion to giving ‘power to 
the people’ represents a wish that should be respected (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, p.4). 
Some interpreters might go further and argue that negative assumptions about the 
politics of other citizens are a good thing: conceivably they could encourage voting in greater 
numbers, since to rational, interest-maximising individuals (the existence of whom many such 
models assume), the appeal of voting should increase in line with their scepticism about other 
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people’s level of engagement.  Insofar as they assume other citizens to be reluctant voters, the 
weight of their own vote is all the higher, while insofar as they consider other citizens 
susceptible to bad ideas, the need for ‘right-thinking’ citizens to minimise the electoral 
consequences is higher too.  Even from this perspective however, one would not be entirely 
sanguine: as suggested above, there is the troubling possibility this might invite longing for the 
strong leader who can overcome the deficiencies of other citizens and ‘get the job done’ despite 
them.  Encouraged to an authoritarian tendency, there is the danger citizens might break out of 
the rather limited role this type of political theory reserves for them.   
For those advocating a deliberative model of politics (Habermas 1996), the problematic 
aspect of such discursive practices is likely to be unequivocal.  The exercise of public reason 
requires that political debate be entered into on a fair and equal basis, and while deliberative 
democrats have been accused of an elitist tendency (Sanders 1997), many nonetheless retain an 
emphasis on popular participation as a means to achieve optimal deliberation.  However, if 
negative assumptions about the political capacities of other citizens are prevalent, the fear would 
be this leads to calls for their exclusion from the deliberative process.  Its fair and equal basis 
would break down.  Alternatively, the quality of debate might suffer not through the exclusion of 
voices but through the adaptation of interventions to suit what is expected of others.  Opinions 
might come to be silenced not because individual citizens wish to suppress them, but because 
they consider them the kinds of opinion others will disapprove of or be unwilling to support.  
One might see spirals of silence (Noelle-Neumann 1984), or ‘spirals of noise’ whereby ideas 
gain ground because of their supposed attraction to others, phenomena of particular concern for 
those interested in the rationality of political debate.   
Those taking an agonistic perspective on democracy are also likely to be troubled 
should such assumptions be widespread (Mouffe 2000).  The very essence of political life in this 
perspective consists in collective action on matters of common concern; it is ultimately this, 
rather than some notion of interlocking interests, identity, or love of justice, which is seen to hold 
the political unit together, and only by mobilising citizens can progressive causes be advanced.  
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If the presence of negative assumptions about the political capacities of other citizens makes the 
initiation of collective action more difficult, this can only have a corrosive impact on the health 
of the political community.  Scepticism towards other citizens is likely to be regarded as more 
damaging even than disaffection with elite representatives, since it may prevent criticism of the 
status quo being accompanied by the call for actors outside professional politics to remake the 
political scene.
8
  The challenge would then be to awaken a greater sense of the feasibility of 
collective agency in the face of scepticism about the willingness of others to take action.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
These reflections underscore how a pattern of scepticism concerning the politics of other citizens 
is problematic, albeit to a varied degree, from the perspective of each of several models of 
citizenship.  The remedies one might foresee clearly vary between these perspectives, but a 
common basis for concern appears evident.  By describing other citizens as they do, speakers set 
the parameters of their own citizenship practices, and risk acquiring some of the very 
dispositions they project onto others.  They risk becoming ‘other citizens’ themselves, as it were.  
Yet while the language of citizenship is spoken in pessimistic tones, equally it seems too quick to 
suppose a preference for ‘stealth democracy’, for any appearance of the notion that other 
members of the community could be galvanised by an initiative suggests a more active 
conception of citizenship remains possible also.  Whether this possibility is taken up to serve 
ends consistent with liberal democracy, or is used to mobilise for authoritarian causes, remains 
open.   
A question that might be considered further concerns how different patterns of 
assumption come to the fore in different discursive contexts, and what the significance may be of 
the specificity with which political problems, situations and actors are defined.  For one 
possibility is that the negativity is strongest where fellow citizens appear in their most abstract 
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guise, ‘others’ linked to the subject through no more than common membership in the political 
community.  If this is so, it may be that richer conceptions of citizenship will need to be sought 
in the instances where others are cast encumbered with shared concerns and substantive goals.  
Some grounds for the idea were noted in this study.  More clearly delineated forms of 
subjecthood, coupled with the articulation of common challenges, perhaps provide some of the 
resources that can be deployed by those seeking to breathe life back into the politics of other 
citizens. 
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2
 The focus may also be distinguished from the study of trust in political leaders and confidence in political 
institutions, matters extensively studied in the literature on political cynicism and distrust: e.g. (Dalton 2004). 
3
 The interviews were loosely structured, with approximately the first twenty minutes of each discussion devoted to 
an exercise based on thematic index cards.  This was followed by an open discussion led principally by the 
participants themselves and focused on the political issues they considered to be most urgent.  The material below is 
drawn from these open sections of the discussions.  For further details, see (Author 2009a) and (Author 2009b), 
where some of the main findings of the project are discussed, notably to do with patterns of problem definition, 
comparison, and perceptions of political agency. 
4
 In Britain and Germany the rates were €60-70 per head; in the Czech Republic c. €40.  These rates were above 
waiting-time, and intended to represent a good return on two hours’ work for most drivers; however, they were not 
so high that a driver might not, in principle, have made the same amount in the same time from fare-paying 
customers.  Each discussion was facilitated by the author in the local language and recorded using audio 
microphone. 
5
 This is a slogan which the newspaper has used in advertising campaigns. 
6
 The arguments for emphasising discursive rather than mental phenomena laid out in (Potter and Wetherell 1987) are of 
particular relevance here. 
7
 Importantly, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse make a twofold distinction between ‘process preferences’ and ‘policy 
preferences’, and stress the importance of the former at the expense of the latter.  It may be necessary, however, to 
distinguish within the second category between people’s depth of concern about what particular policies are adopted 
(on which indifference may be expressed) and their depth of concern about the substantive problem itself which 
needs to be addressed (on which stronger views may be voiced). 
8
 Arguably democracy requires that those disaffected with ‘the system’ still retain the hope that actors can emerge 
from civil society able to change it.  The significance of such views seems to be underplayed by scholars of political 
cynicism and disaffection who focus purely on attitudes towards elite actors: cf. (Dalton 2004), who looks at ‘public 
confidence and trust in, and support for, politicians, political parties, and political institutions’ (p.191). 
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